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reasons for thinking that we are perfectly justified in 
letting the finding of the District Court on this point 
~main undisturbed. Judge Gurfein's opinion certainly 
stated the governing principles of Roth and Perry accurately, 
and I cannot see why at this late stage of the litigation 
we would encourage further dispute over what, under Roth 
and Perry, are interpretations of state law. I am fortified 
in this conclusion, I think, by the way in which respondent 
deals in his brief with the cases upon which Judge Gurfein 
relied; as I read it, he in effect says "that is all well 
and good, but here we are talking about stigma". But the 
main body of the per curiam deals with the stigma point, and 
once that is out of the case on the merits I do not think 
even respondent seriously quarrels with Judge Gurfein's 
analysis of the New York law. 
(2) Instead of the present content of the newly added 
footnote 2, it could be replaced by a statement to ~he 
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~ ~- ~ COUrt of Appea1a dL5 not dec~de the iaeue 
• .,..._._, ill~eat ", and t:bere:fo~:e we have no occasion 
,_ ~H assy riew on i.t here. Tbi.a woul.d preaumab1y 1eave 
t:M -tt:er open to tJie couzot o~ Appeal• on xemand. 
(3) Adopt: ..Tolm • • ueableat of the "pxopaxty intexest" 
. 
b•ue ....Ued ia Put: %%% of hie p~eaent: 4i•aent. 
JCr I»E'•~•rence i• tM :f~•t: alt:enative, but. if a 
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Each of us can read for ourselves Part III of Potter's 
~ opinion, 408 u.s. 576-578, analyzing the concept of a 
property interest in employment. I quote the following: 
"But the important fact in this case is that 
they specifically provided that the respondent's 
employment was to terminate on June 30. They 
did not provide for contract renewal absent 
'sufficient cause.' Indeed, they made no pro-
vision for renewal whatsoever. 
"Thus, the terms of the respondent's appoint-
ment secured absolutely no interest in re-employ-
ment for the ne£t year. They supported absolutely 
no possible claim of entitlement to re-employment. 
Nor, significantly, was there any state statute 
or University rule or policy that secured his 
interest in re-employment or that created any 
legitimate claim to it. In these circumstances, 
the respondent surely had an abstract concern 
in being rehired, but he did not have a property 
interest sufficient to require the University 
authorities to give him a hearing when they 
declined to renew his contract of employment." 
408 u.s., at 578 (footnote omitted). 
I submit that procedural protections of job tenure 
incorporated in some statute or regulation pertaining to the 
job classification itself are quite different than general 
principles of administrative law, which frequently provide 
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t:hai: i:he action of any public official which is "arbitrary 
md capricious" may be set aside by a reviewing court. Xt 
aeama to me that this is what the holding of the New York 
Court of Appeals in Talamo v. Murphy, 38 N.Y. 2d 637 (1976), 
represents. The action was ·brought under Article 78 of the 
N.Y. C.P.L.R., which as z understand it ia the codified 
equivalent of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. The 
action of t:he supervising employer is subject to 1imited 
t:e¥iev on ail •BJ:bit:razy an4 capzoiaioue" atan4ard, not 
hca- 1feW York confers any statutory or contractual interest 
aoatinued employaent on probationary employees, but 
hcau•e it does not vieh it• public officials of wliatever 
IIBb&'e actLiaf .ta •• a~:.lduazy and capricioua manner. The 
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virtually certain that 
every termination of employees 
heretofore thought t b o e nontenured could give rise to a 
§ 1983 claim in a federal court. 
It would also create a burgeoning class of other 
property interests entirely apart from employee tenure. In 
effect we would be saying that if a state authorizes judicial 
review of official acts if they are claimed to be arbitrary 
and capricious, such review by itself confers on the claimant 
a "property interest" which under the Fourteenth Amendment 
entitles him to an administrative hearing unknown to state 
law, or to exactly the same state judicial hearing which this 
respondent has always had available to him under Article 78 
but chose not to pursue. Into such an abyss I would much 
prefer not to journey. 
Si~cerely 'wW' 
